Megablitz and more: A Battle lost? Part 1 - different war, same place

When deciding on a scenario for this years game I considered various options before narrowing them down to two - the Gazala battles in North Africa (1942) and the campaign in the west in 1940. As I had around 20 players to entertain this ruled out Gazala, which would struggle to provide gainful employment to more than a dozen or so. So back in Europe, having played a version of the Dyle Plan in Belgium some yeas ago I decided on the panzer breakthrough in mid-May. This assumed a successful crossing of the Meuse and would see no fewer then seven Panzer divisions let loose in northern France against a French Army Group already suffering from (in its upper echelons at least) poor morale and much bewilderment.

The real map. Like the originals this was one of Michelin's finest. The six tables are marked out with highlighter pen. The line marking the northern edge of the playing area runs north of Fauqambergues, Bethune, Valenciennes, Beaumont. In the south, Amiens is the big urban area just off map 6, and the line then runs to the south of Montcornet and Berlise. Abbeville is just off to the west of the marked area.

The elite of the Wehrmacht listen attentively to General Von Munster's briefing.

The French commander was given eight infantry divisions and and assets including three tank battalions and some artillery and allowed to deploy them more or less as he pleased. Two armoured divisions and a motorised infantry division were on their way to reinforce. He was also told that the six aerodromes in his sector held considerable air assets.

The French team indulges in one of several musical interludes. At one point the

Germans offered to withdraw if only the French would stop singing!

The table setup. Three of us managed to rearrange the room and set up these tables in only 1 hour!

I reproduce below (with the kind permission of Jim Wallman) the briefing document issued by Von Munster to his Generals. Further down the page are the individual table maps.

German Briefing

Objectives: Head for the coast, cutting off French 1^st Army and the BEF to the north. Do not get distracted by chasing individual enemy units or besieging towns.

Command Structure

Unit	Role	Player
Panzer Gruppe West	Lt-General Hermann Von Munster	Jim Wallman

XIV Corps	General of Infantry Gustav Anton von Wietersheim	Jerry Elsmore
Comprising:
11 Division 44 Division 72 Division	Lt General Herbert von Böckmann	Tom Mouat
23 Pz Division	Major-General Hans Reichsfreiherr von Boineburg-Lengsfeld	Trevor Ringrose

XIX Corps	General of Cavalry Heinz Guderian	Phil Steele
11 Pz Division	General der Panzertruppen Ludwig Crüwell	Wayne Thomas
7 Pz Division	Brigadier-general Erwin Rommel	Peter Antill
2 Pz Division	Maj-General Rudolf Veiel

XXXI Corps	Major-General Georg-Hans Reinhardt	Fred Cartwright
Comprising:
3 Mot. Division	Major-General Walter Lichel	Adrian Hussey
14 Pz Division	Major-General Erick-Oskar Hansen	Harry Kelly
8 Pz Division	Colonel Erich Brandenberger	John Armatys
19 Pz Division	General der Panzertruppen Otto von Knobelsdorff	Colin Maby

Lufwaffe Support : Luftflotte 2

Requests for air support are all via Panzer Gruppe W HQ at all times. Maximum concentration is to be used, so requests for ‘penny packet’ air support will be automatically denied.

Lufwaffe resources allocated to this operation are:

2 Fighter, 2 Zestorer, 3 Stuka, 1 Bomber and 1 recce squadrons

Communications: Commanders may only communicate with their immediate superior or subordinates. All communication will be in writing unless the unit HQs are co-located.

Morale

You represent the best the German Reich has to offer and your Fatherland expects great things of you. This is the first battle against a modern and well equipped major power and its allies and will be a true test of the new German Army.

Medals will be issued to commanders who show the highest energy and correct degree of offensive spirit.

Similarly, where performance does not reach the highest standards of the Wehrmacht, the high command will be removing underperforming officers to duties more in keeping with their abilities.

Doctrine

There is, as yet, no Army doctrine for armoured warfare. Theorists are agreed that massed armoured formations supported by air power are the weapon of the future, but exactly how that will work in practice has not yet been pinned down. Experience in Poland showed us that our panzer divisions were prone to breakdowns and had serious logistical problems, but the lack of an enemy with modern weapons meant that we could not properly test war fighting doctrines. Many of the logistical issues have now been resolved, but the principles of modern tank warfare are still in their in their infancy. There is confidence at the highest level that concentrated massed tank offensives will achieve a great victory. However, military experience tells us that it also carries with it very great potential risks.

Each Corps is therefore able to develop the tactics is feels will be most successful, subject to some overriding principles – these principles are:

a. Our primary mission is to reach the Channel, not to necessarily destroy enemy units.

b. Speed of advance is everything. We demonstrated in Great War during the Kaiserschlacht Offensive in 1918 that bypassing strong points and advancing rapidly throws the enemy into disarray.

c. We only have a few Panzer Divisions. There are no more coming if we lose these.

d. Our enemy is well equipped and cunning. None of us can forget the French Army’s ability to exploit weakness and counterattack with ferocity as they did on the Marne in 1914. So - whilst we are facing some of the weakest units of the French Army, we must not forget that they have powerful reserves and might still ‘pull something out of the bag.’

Once the campaign is successfully concluded, we will be in a position to firm up our doctrine for Panzer Troops based on your actions experience and successes.